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Palmerlee: The Availability and Limitations of the Private Nuisance Doctrine

THE AVAILABILITY AND LIMITATIONS OF THE
PRIVATE NUISANCE DOCTRINE IN WYOMING*
INTRODUCTION

There is currently sufficient statutory authority to enable
the Wyoming Public Health Department to maintain the
quality of Wyoming waters in their present high state. There
is proposed a legislative scheme that would insure it.1 But
this proposed legislation and that already on the books is
directed toward administrative regulation of pollution, and
neither creates express remedies for an individual suffering
the effects of water pollution. To the extent that individual
relief is available in Wyoming, it arises out of the common

law. In the western states, the remedies arising at common
law are largely derivative of prior appropriation water law
and the common law doctrine of nuisance. Regarding Wyoming water law, the appropriation doctrine provides significant protection based on the existence of a water right; it is
of no use absent a water right. The primary protection afforded the holder of a senior right is from pollution by a
junior that interferes with the legitimate exercise of the
senior water right.2 Some measure of protection is afforded
a junior to the extent that generally a change in use by an
upstream senior (and of course junior) cannot be made to
the detriment of other existing rights.' This would prevent a
senior from changing his use to one which would increase pollution sufficiently to interfere with use of the water by the
downstream junior. And as between one without a water right
and one with such a right, the holder of the right is protected
from pollution that interferes with that right.'
*This comment was financed by the Water Resources Research Institute
of the University of Wyoming.
1. For current laws see Wyo. STAT. §§ 85-184 to -200. A proposed water
quality acts was introduced and defeated in the 1971 session of the Wyoming
legislature, but it or a revised version thereof will undoubtedly be introduced in 1973.
2. CLARK, WATERS & WATER RIcHTS § 212.2 (1967).
8. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575,
272 P.2d 629 (1954).
4. CLARK, supra note 2.
Copyright@ 1972 by the University of Wyoming
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There are, however, many private uses of water (recreational, aesthetic, and commercial) 5 which, are not dependent
upon a water right and yet deserve protection from the effects
of water pollution.6 Such uses may suffer direct monetary
effects from pollution, as in the case of livestock poisoning,
or indirect, as in the destruction of the aesthetic value of
property fronting on a stream. In either case, the loss is real
and the values destroyed are deserving of protection. That
protection may be available in the common law doctrine of
nuisance-a remedy as yet untested in Wyoming in the water
pollution context. It is this remedy that will be examined
herein to determine its utility in protecting water use not dependent upon a water right.7
PRIVATE NUISANCE

As is customary when discussing nuisance, it should first
be noted that the term and doctrine have historically been
loosely applied and have generated much judicial imprecision.
The conceptual distinctions between negligence, trespass and
nuisance have not been maintained nor has the distinction
between public and private nuisance. This latter distinction,
critical to an intelligent discussion of nuisance has reference
to the right invaded. The obvious distinction is that public
nuisance is related to the invasion of a public right, whereas
private nuisance arises upon the invasion of an individual's
right.' It is the latter, private nuisance, that would normally
provide a remedy for an individual and so will be first
examined in the Wyoming context. Public nuisance will be
later treated to the extent that it is available for a personal
remedy and to the extent that it poses a defense in a private
nuisance action.
5. Though recreational and aesthetic uses not dependent on water right are
obvious, commercial uses may not be. Examples are non-diversionary
natural irrigation, small scale stock watering, and recreational business
such as leasing of fishing rights.
6. For a fundamental technical discussion and definition of water pollution
see Matthew, Practical Comment: A Lawyer's Pollution Primer, 16 S.D. L.
REV. 309 (1971).
7. It should be noted that the existence of a water right in a plaintiff does
not preclude a private nuisance action, given the appropriate elements of
nuisance.
8. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 999 (1966).
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Wyoming, like other jurisdictions, has not avoided the
conceptual difficulties characteristic of nuisance as evidenced
by Lore v. Town of Douglas.9 In that case private nuisance,
apparently raised as an afterthought in oral argument, was
defined as "a class of wrongs which arises from an unreasonable, unwarranted or unlawful use by a person of his own
property, working an obstruction or injury to the right of
another.""0 Though it is unclear from the opinion, apparently
the court did not rely on the belated nuisance argument but
rather on a negligence theory. This is to the credit of the
court; the plaintiff suffered damage from a physical invasion
of waters backed up into his cellar by a municipal sewage system, rather than from a non-trespassory interference, which
is the characteristic element of private nuisance. Fortunately
then, this inadequate definition is dicta and need not be
relied upon. In Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest
Refining Co.," a Wyoming case decided in federal court,
the plaintiff based his action on a "continuing trespass which
amounts to nuisance," apparently unaware of the fact that,
definitionally, one precludes the other.2 The factual situation
might account for the plaintiff's eclectic theory; it had apparent aspects of both physical trespass and non-trespassory
interference. The court, however, relied solely on the basis
of the physical trespass of oil deposited on the plaintiff's
pasture."8 Consequently, the appropriate theory would have
been unintentional trespass rather than nuisance. Nevertheless, the court decided the case on the basis of a "continuing
trespass amounting to a nuisance," neither clarifying nor
commenting on the theory of action.
Two additional Wyoming cases, Hazard Powder Co. v.
Volger,14 and Hilimer v. McConnell Brothers," granted relief
to private parties based expressly on nuisance theories. However, the facts indicate, though the court did not, that each
9. 355 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1960).
10. Id. at 370.
11. Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 276 F. 932 (D. Wyo.
1922), afI'd 294 F. 597 (8th Cir. 1923).
12. If the interference is with the plaintiff's exclusive possession, it is a
trespass; if not, i.e., non-trespassory, it is a nuisance. It can't be both.
13. Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., supra note 11, at 937.
14. 58 F. 152 (8th Cir. 1893).
15. 414 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1966).
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case was a public nuisance situation in which an individual
derived a right of action due to special circumstances.
Strangely enough, two spite fence cases 6 are the only Wyoming cases that factually fit the private nuisance category.
Lore and Sussex are factually trespass cases; Hazard and
Hillmer are actually public nuisance; and the balance 7 not
discussed here are expressly public nuisance cases. And,
though both of the spite fence cases factually fit into the
private nuisance category, only one, Schork v. Epperson,"s
provides any conceptual assistance. Fortunately, however, it
expressly adopts the Restatement criteria 9 for determining
what constitutes a private nuisance and thereby provides a
solid foundation for subsequent Wyoming private nuisance
actions."0 It is worth noting that, absent Schork, a Wyoming
plaintiff would be hard pressed to frame a nuisance action
based on Wyoming law and would be dependent on either textbook law or precedent from other jurisdictions. Given the
adoption of the Restatement concept of nuisance, the plaintiff is provided with a precise conceptual framework into
which he can fit his fact situation.
The characteristic element of the Restatement definition 2
of private nuisance is a non-trespassory interference with a
person's use and enjoyment of his land.22 It is this element
16.

Schork v. Epperson, 74 Wyo. 286, 287 P.2d 467 (1955) ; Erickson v. Hudson,
70 Wyo. 317, 249 P.2d 523 (1952).

17.

See 6 WYOMING DIGEST, Nuisance.

18. Schork v. Epperson, 74 Wyo. 286, 287 P.2d 467 (1955).
19. Id. at 471.
20. In Schork, the court used the Restatement criteria to determine whether a
spite fence was unreasonable and therefore a nuisance and enjoinable.
21. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939) :
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoymen of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to
the use or enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules
governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.
Tent. Draft No. 17 (1971) RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 is
somewhat modified but the changes recommended do not materially affect
the discussion herein.
22. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 823 (1939) for what rights in land are necessary to maintain a private nuisance action.
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that distinguishes it from other tort concepts: it is first defined by the right invaded rather than the activity causing the
invasion. Given that invasion, the activity causing it can be
intentional, negligent, or merely inappropriate to its location. 3 But, without an interference with a use or enjoyment
of land, it is not a nuisance; nor is there a nuisance if the
interference results from a physical invasion constituting a
trespass, for the invasion must be non-trespassory. The initial
question, then, is whether the interference is with a use or
enjoyment of land and whether it is non-trespassory. With
this basic element of nuisance established, the next question
is to what extent that particular use is protected. As is apparent from the Restatement definition, 4 this turns on the reasonableness" of the interference, which is determined by the
utility of the conduct causing the interference in relation to
the gravity of the harm inflicted." The ultimate question then
is, does the gravity of the harm suffered from the interference
outweigh the utility of the conduct. Thus, in the abstract,
the task of the plaintiff is to show2" that the defendant is unreasonably polluting water to the extent that it is interfering
with the plaintiff's enjoyment of his property.
What constitutes such.a showing in a factual setting is an
unanswered question in Wyoming. The only Wyoming nuisance case dealing with water pollution, Sussex, turned out,
in fact, to be a trespass case. There is, however, limited case
law from other jurisdictions in which nuisance was successfully employed in a pollution context. 8 The Restatement also
23. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, 8upra note 21.
24. Id.
25. Reasonableness is an element of liability under both sub-paragraphs (d) (1)
and (d) (ii) of the Restatement definition because unreasonableness is
found in reckless, negligent and ultrahazardous conduct.
26. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 826 (1939).
27. For a discussion of burden of proof problems see Krier, Environmental
Litigation and the Burden of Proof, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 105
(Baldwin and Page ed. 1970).
28. American Cyanamid Co. v. Sparto, 267 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co., 53 F. 970 (D. Ind. 1893); Nolan
v. New Britain, 69 Conn. 668 38 A. 703 (1897); Hodges v. Pine Product
Co., 135 Ga. 134, 68 S.E. 1107 (1910); West Muncie Strawboard Co. v.
Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N.E. 879 (1904); Newton v. Grundy Center, 246
Iowa 916, 70 N.W.2d 162 (1955) ; Livezey v. Bel Air, 174 Md. 568, 199 A.
838 (1938); Weeks-Thorn Paper Co. v. Glenside Woolen Mills, 64 Misc. 205,
118 N.Y.S. 1027 (1909), aff'd 204 N.Y. 635, 97 N.W. 1118; Pennsylvania
R.R. Co. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924); Shoffner
v. Sutherland, 111 Va. 298, 68 S.E. 996 (1910),
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provides some further assistance in making such a determination because it defines reasonableness in terms of utility of
conduct and gravity of harm, followed by an extensive discussion thereof.2 9 A point of particular significance in pollution
suits which has received attention in Wyoming is that one element of utility of conduct, as defined by section 828 of the
Restatement, is its social value. This obviously may present
a significant obstacle if the defendant is a municipality or
large employer." The issue was raised in Sussex"' but apparently was not determinative of the result and received no
direct treatment bylThe court. It was, however, given implicit
recognition in the court's discussion of "comparative injury"" and was expressly recognized by the Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals. 3 In light of the current awareness of the
social costs of pollution, it is conceivable that recognition of
the social value of the defendant's conduct would work in
favor of the plaintiff. These costs would certainly offset to
some degree the social utility of a particular enterprise. This
public interest in reducing pollution has been expressly recognized, though not in Wyoming, as relevant in a private action
seeking abatement of a private nuisance. 4
The topic of comparative injury arose in Sussex in the
court's discussion of whether an injunction would issue as
requested or whether the plaintiff would have to settle for
damages. The decree evolving from that discussion is exemplary of the basic rule: an activity may be reasonable when
payment is made for the harm it causes but unreasonable
absent such compensation.3 The court decreed that damages
be paid for past injury, that annual rental be paid for the
continuing future damage and that, in the event of a failure
to so pay, an injunction would issue. Though an injunction is
29. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826-28 (1939).

30. RESTATEMENT

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

(SECOND)
OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971) recommends
the addition of a fourth consideration to section 828 for determining the
utility of conduct: "whether it is impractical to maintain the activity if it
is required to bear the cost of compensating for the invasion." If this were
adopted the burden on the plaintiff seeking damages would be raised in
that situation to the equivalent of that required for damages.
Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., supra note 11, at 934.
Id. at 947.
294 F. 597, 603 (8th Cir. 1923).
Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D. Ore. 1963).
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, ch. 40, Scope & Introductory Note, at 224 (1939).
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probably the preferred remedy in most private nuisance cases,
it requires a substantially greater showing of unreasonableness than does an action for damages. Accordingly, a prudent
plaintiff should, in most situations where abatement is desired, seek damages in addition or at least as an alternative
to injunction. Then, in the event a showing sufficient to
justify injunction is not made, he may at least be compensated
for the harm suffered as a result of the defendant's pollution.
This, of course, requires evidence as to the value of damages,
and in the absence thereof, as in Hillmer, when all the evidence is directed toward justifying an injunction, damages
will not be awarded.
The equitable remedy of injunction has received substantial attention in Wyoming litigation in both nuisance and
other types of actions. 6 The Wyoming Supreme Court has
expressed the usual prerequisite for the granting of injunction-no adequate remedy at law3 7-and the usual purpose
of preventing future wrongful acts." It has also given express
recognition, in the nuisance context, to the much maligned
doctrine of balancing of the equities.39 This doctrine is given
further support in Sussex4 under the comparative injury
label and so is seemingly well entrenched in Wyoming. Some
very narrow points on injunction have also received attention
in Wyoming litigation, one of which is that abatement of a
condition constituting a nuisance extends only to the part
thereof that offends the standard of reasonableness. For example, a spite fence need not be entirely removed 4 nor a dam of
excessive height completely destroyed.4 2 The Tenth Circuit
held that in Wyoming an owner in possession is obliged to
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

The Restatement recognizes that the principles governing injunctive relief are constant whether the basis of action is negligence, nuisance, or
trespass, so each type of action may be precedent for the other with respect
to the principles of injunction. It also points out that a nuisance action
for damages may not be precedent for an injunction because of the different
showing required. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 40, Introductory Note, at
228 (1989).
Miller v. Hagie, 59 Wyo. 383, 140 P.2d 746 (1943).
Brown v. J. C. Penney Co., 54 F. Supp. 488 (D. Wyo. 1943); Olsen v. Leith,
71 Wyo. 316, 257 P.2d 342 (1953).
Hillmer v. McConnell Bros., 414 P.2d 972, 973 (Wyo. 1966).
Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., supra note 11.
Schork v. Epperson, 8upra note 16; Erickson v. Hudson, supra note 16.
State v. Hiber, 48 Wyo. 172, 44 P.2d 1005 (1935).
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abate a nuisance even though it was created by his predecessor. It added that notice and request to abate is a prerequisite
thereto, unless the owner had prior notice and denied the existence of the nuisance.4" An interesting point for a defendant
ordered to abate was made in Clarke v. Chicago." The court
there said that if the order was not followed the court could
let a contract to have the nuisance abated.
DEFENSES

In spite of the limited use of nuisance doctrine in Wyoming, most of the defenses common thereto have apparently
been raised, although to limited advantage. As an extreme
example, in Big Horn Power Co. v. State,4 5 the Wyoming
Supreme Court said that even though a structure was constructed with the express approval of a state officer, the state
could sue for its abatement as a nuisance. It should be noted
that this harsh statement was unnecessary to the result because
the state officer did not, in fact, approve the structure as
built." A traditional defense not available in Wyoming is
that of" coming to the nuisance." 7 It was expressly rejected
8 and rejected in principle if not by name in
in Hazard"
"
Clarke While recognizing the disapproval of this defense,
a plaintiff should realize that nuisance is defined in terms of
reasonableness and that conduct unreasonably offensive in
one setting may not be in another. If he chooses to acquire
land for a home in an industrial area, he may not be subject to
a defense of "coming to the nuisance," but the same result
may obtain because the defendant's conduct may be found
to be reasonable in light of its location. Contribution by
others to the interference with plaintiff's use of his land is
subject to the same analysis. Joint tort-feasors are each individually liable and contribution by another is not a defense.5"
43. Clarke v. Boysen, 39 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 869.
44. Clarke v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co., 62 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1932), cert denied,
290 U.S. 629.
45. 23 Wyo. 271, 148 P 1110, 1115 (1915).
46. Id. at 1115.
47. Purchasing land and moving in next to a nuisance after it is already in
existence.
48. Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger, 58 F. 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1893).
49. Clarke v. Boysen, supra note 43, at 819.
50. Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., supra note 11, at 939.
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However, due to the number or character of the contributors
to the nuisance, the individual or collective conduct may be
found to be reasonable and thereby defeat the action on the
same grounds under a different label.
The class of defenses based on elapsed time has also received considerable attention in Wyoming litigation. The
claim of a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance was rejected in Clarke, though the court expressly precluded this
defense only in the case of public nuisance without commenting on its availability in a private nuisance action." A defense not rejected in Clarke but found to be factually inappropriate was that of laches.5 2 Since the court distinguished it
instead of rejecting it, by negative inference laches is probably
a viable defense to a nuisance action. This inference, however, would have to be confined to the case of private nuisance
because neither the statute of limitations nor laches run
against a public nuisance." If raised in a private nuisance
action, both laches and the statute of limitations commence
running when the defendant's conduct constitutes an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's use or enjoyment
of his land, thereby making it actionable."
When the absence of malicious intent was raised as a defense in Schork, the court adopted the Restatement formula 5
holding that malicious intent is determinative for the plaintiff only when it is the sole motivation for the offensive conduct. If it is not, as in Schork, then the normal balancing of
utility and gravity is employed to make a determination of
reasonableness. A most fundamental defense was raised and
rejected in Big Horn Power Co." The defendant claimed that
the decree ordering him to remove the superstructure of a
dam which constiuted a nuisance was an unconstitutional tak51. Clarke v. Boysen, supra note 43, at 818.
52. Id.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821 (c), at 15 (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971). The obvious implication is that where there is a coincidence of public
and private nuisance, an individual can avoid the statute of limitations or
laches by bringing the action based on a public nuisance with a particular
damage rather than on private nuisance.
54. PROSSER, TORTS § 89, at 595 (4th ed. 1971).
55. Schork v. Epperson, supra note 18, at 470.
56. Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 23 Wyo. 271, 148 P. 1110 (1915).
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ing without just compensation. The rationale for dismissing
this defense is not entirely clear from the court's statement.
It held that the taking was not for a public use but rather an
exercise of the police power of the state to remove a nuisance. 7 Whatever the rationale, had that defense prevailed,
nuisance doctrine in Wyoming would have become in many
instances a cause without a remedy.
PUBLIC NUISANCE

Absent the common label, there is little relation between
public and private nuisance. While private nuisance is concerned solely with private rights incident to property, public
nuisance embraces all those rights held by the public.5 What
constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a public right may be
either conclusively established by statute, 9 regulation or ordinance6° or may in the absence thereof be determined by the
same criteria used for private nuisance. 6 The significance
of public nuisance for the individual seeking a remedy is twofold. First, it may present an avenue for abating a nuisance
or recovering damages. Second, it may be raised as a defense
in a private nuisance action. With respect to the first, a public nuisance is actionable by an individual when he has suffered or is suffernig particular harm different in kind from
that suffered by other members of the public.6" This can
arise as in Hazard6 3 where the plaintiff's home was destroyed
when a powder magazine exploded which had been maintained
in violation of a city ordinance, or as in Hillmer6 4 where the
plaintiff sued to enjoin the operation of a rabbit processing
plant operated in violation of statute.
57. Id. at 1115.
58. There is currently no treatment of public nuisance in the RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS but the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971) has included a new section on public nuisance. This new section incorporates most of what Prosser says in his article, Prosser, Private Action
for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).
59. Hillmer v. McConnel Bros., supra note 39.
60. Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933).
61. Prosser, PrivateAction for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1004 (1966).
62. Id. at 1005; Knight v. City of Riverton, 71 Wyo. 459, 259 P.2d 748 (1953) ;
Anthony Wilkinson Livestock Co. v. McIlquam, 14 Wyo. 209, 83 P. 364
(1905).
63. Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger, supra note 48.
64. Hillmer v. McConnell Bros., supra note 39.
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Hazard is exemplary of the simple particular damage
situation; Hillmer presents a special situation where public
and private nuisance coincide. The rabbit processing plant
was a public nuisance by legislative declaration, but it also
constituted an interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his adjacent land. It was, therefore, a private
nuisance. The important point is that, although the damage
suffered by the individual is the same in kind as that of the
public (obnoxious odors), because the right in that individual
derives also from his possession of land, it is an interference
with his use or enjoyment thereof and gives rise to an actionable private nuisance. This actionable private nuisance constitutes in itself "particular damage" from the public nuisance and, therefore, the plaintiff may maintain an action for
either private nuisance or public nuisance--even absent injury different in kind due to the coincidence of private nuisance.6 In Hillmer, the court did not specify whether the
nuisance upon which it based the injunction was public or
private, but it seems clear that it should have been based on
a finding of private nuisance, rather than on public nuisance
with injury different in kind.
This raises the second reason that public nuisance may be
important to the individual. In such a situation, the defendant could have raised the public nuisance doctrine in defense
asserting that a public nuisance absent particular damage
different in kind is not actionable by an individual. Since the
damage suffered was not different in kind, this defense would
have defeated the action if the plaintiff was unaware of the
coincidence of private nuisance giving him standing, even
absent damage different in kind. An example used by Prosser
illustrates this concept in the water pollution context: "Thus
the pollution of a stream which merely affects a large number
of riparian owners is a private nuisance only, but it becomes
a public one when it kills the fish."" Here, the existence of
the public nuisance does not destroy the private nuisance; a
65. Prosser, supra note 61, at 1018.
66. Id. at 1001.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 7 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 8

556

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VII

riparian" who suffers an interference with the use or enjoyment of his land still has a viable action. For example, that
interference might be with the use of his land for fishing-a
private right associated with his ownership of the land as
opposed to the public loss of the fish in the stream. The
measure of damages would reflect this approach, being the
value of the loss of the use of the land for fishing rather than
the value of the fish lost." Since the coincidence of public
and private nuisande is common to pollution cases, the recognition of a private nuisance in a public nuisance setting may
give a landowner a cause of action otherwise overlooked or
allow rebuttal of an otherwise determinative defense.
Another area of confusion arising out of the relationship
of public and private nuisance is the role played by statutes,
regulations, and ordinances. 9 In the first instance, statutes
can and do declare that certain conditions constitute a public
nuisance.7" Such declarations are binding on a court in a
public nuisance action. Secondly, there arc statutes that are
identical to the nuisance statutes in that they prescribe a
penalty and provide for abatement by a public official, yet
they do not use the term nuisance." A third category is that
in which these two kinds of enactments additionally create an
express private remedy for violation of the standards estab67.
68.
69.

70.

71.

The term riparian is used in the sense of one owning land adjacent to the
stream rather than one whose rights to the use of the stream are defined
by riparian water law doctrine.
Hodges v. Pine Product Co., 135 Ga. 134, 68 S.E. 1107, 1109 (1910).
Statutes, regulations and ordinances will all be treated under the label of
statute and will be considered for the sake of simplicity as being of the
same effect. The power of the state and of Wyoming cities to declare that
particular conditions constitute a nuisance has been expressly recognized
in Wyoming. See notes 59-60 supra. Though regulations have the same
force as statutes, they have not always been given as much weight in the
nuisance field as have the statutes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 286,
at 26 (1965). Additionally, some jurisdictions differentiate between statutes
and ordinances. PROSSER, TORTS § 36, at 201 (4th ed. 1971) ; see also Note,
Water Quality Standards in Private Nuisance Actions, 79 YALE L.J. 102
(1969).
For nuisance statutes related to water pollution see WYO. STAT. § 35-462
(1957) (depositing or placing refuse matter into rivers); WYO. STAT. § 35464 (1957) (throwing sawdust into streams) ; Wyo. STAT. § 35-479 (1957)
(pollution of waters). Wyoming water quality standards have been enacted
under the authority of WYo. STAT. §§ 35-184, 185 (1957).
For nuisance type statutes related to water pollution see Wyo. STAT. § 35196 (1957) (contamination of streams) ; WYO. STAT. § 35-189 (1957) (pollution by industrial plants); WYO. STAT. § 35-188 (1957) (sewage to be
purified); WYo. STAT. § 30-96.6 (Supp. 1971) (open cut reclamation, impoundment of effluent).
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lished by the statute." These three situations are relatively
straightforward in application. The difficulty is in a fourth
category. Here there is a coincidence of private nuisance with
a statutory public nuisance. The difficulty arises out of the
application of the statutory declaration to the determination
of the reasonableness of the interference with the use of an
individual's land. There are three alternatives: violation of
the statutory standard is conclusive of an unreasonable interference, is merely evidence thereof, or is of no relevance whatsoever. Wyoming has not addressed this question in the
nuisance context. 3 However, it has arisen several times in
the automobile accident negligence area. The Tenth Circuit
concluded as to the state of Wyoming law on this point as
follows:
It would seem that while the Wyoming [Supreme] Court has not drawn a clear distinction between the terms negligence per se and evidence of
negligence, it is nonetheless committed to the doctrine
that a violation of a traffic law or regulation will
impose liability only when it is the proximate cause
of the resulting injuries. 4
The main thrust of the rule is probably of little help in the
nuisance category since proximate cause would rarely be an
issue. It does, however, apparently stand for the proposition
that violation of a statute is at least relevant in establishing
the requisite standard of care in a negligence action. This
logically should apply as well in delineating the standards in
72. Search of the Wyoming Statutes disclosed no statute related to water pollution that creates an express private remedy.
73. The Wyoming Supreme Court did specifically say in Hillmer v. McConnell
Brothers that the pertinent statute was binding on the court in determining
whether maintenance of a processing plant was a nuisance. However, the
court did not specify that it was referring to a private nuisance, and the
next sentence had reference to the police power of the state, the prior statement was probably in reference to a public nuisance. Had the court specified the basis of the action, i.e., public or private nuisance, the significance
of the above statement would be clear, but in the absence thereof, it would
be risky to rely upon Hillmer for the proposition that violation of a statute
is conclusive of an unreasonable interference.
74. Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 64 (10th Cir. 1958). This conclusion was
cited with approval in Zanetti Bus Lines, Inc., v. Hurd, 320 F.2d 123, 128
(10th Cir. 1963) and Checker Yellow Cab Co., Inc., v. Shiflett, 351 P.2d 660
(Wyo. 1960).
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a nuisance action. Assuming but not concluding 5 that such
is the case, a Wyoming court can treat a violation of a nuisance or nuisance type statute as either conclusive of or evidence of an unreasonable interference with the use of land.
Casting the proposition in the reciprocal-of what effect is
compliance with a statute-points up an apparent logical
constriction in that choice. If violation constitutes nuisance
per se, then compliance should be determinative that the interference is not unreasonable. This constraint, however, is
apparent rather than real. 6 Compliance may be but a minimum general standard and not preclude a conclusion that
under the circumstances the objectionable conduct is unreasonable even though in compliance with the applicable statute.
This recognizes that public and private rights, even of the
same nature, are not necessarily coextensive. The problem
can, of course, be avoided by treating a violation as evidentiary rather than as conclusive. This more flexible approach
recognizes the difference in extent of public and private
rights and precludes an unreasonable judgment resulting from
a mechanistic approach.7 7
CONCLUSION

There are those who are generally skeptical of the usefulness of the private nuisance action in the environmental
context.7" This skepticism may well be justified if the perspective is regional or national and oriented toward systematic reform. However, within the broad context of that
perspective, the private nuisance action may well provide a
remedy to the individual whose situation was overlooked in
the grand design. Whether it will in Wyoming is as yet an
unanswered question; there is no specific precedent for it.
75. Though a rational conclusion, a Wyoming court could certainly decide otherwise. To rely, therefore, entirely on a violation of statute to prove an unreasonable interference would undoubtedly be risky.
76. PROSSER, TORTS § 36, at 203 (4th ed. 1971).
77. Id. at 202; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 provides a set of tests
to determine whether or not the statutory standard should be adopted, but
it specifically limits the application thereof to negligence actions. Id. § 286,
at 27. Nevertheless, it is analytically helpful in the nuisance context.
78. Johnson, The Changing Role of Courts in Water Quality Management,
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & PUBLIC POLICY, 200-01 (Campbell &
Sylvester ed. 1968).
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But the absence of factual precedent does not preclude a
successful private nuisance action to attack pollution. "What
is 'reasonable' depends on a variety of considerations and
circumstances,''" and pollution is becoming less reasonable
with each passing day.
DAVID F. PALMERLEE

79.

Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 F. 597, 602 (8th
Cir. 1923).
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